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ABSTRACT 
 This research was conducted in response to a request by Total Force Structure 
Division (TFSD), Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD), Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC) and will serve to provide the TFSD with 
recommendations for any potential improvements that can be made to the current troop-
to-task analysis instructions or the process by which it is conducted.  In this context, a 
troop-to-task analysis is a methodological process of matching the suitable number and 
quality of personnel and equipment to a unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) for 
the purpose of justifying the need for uncompensated force structure.  The study finds 
that the current template will adequately provide a simple but often subjective analysis 
from the unit requesting uncompensated force structure.  If a more thorough analysis is 
desired or required, recommendations include further development of standardized troop-
to-task business rules, the continued use or new development of existing proprietary 
contractual analytical software, or a restructuring of the current force structure analysis 
divisions, e.g., conduct third-party troop-to-task analysis vice relying on those provided 
by the requesting units. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to conduct a qualitative analysis of the Marine Corps 
Total Force Structure Division’s troop-to-task analysis process.  In order to do this, a 
thorough examination of the overlapping force structure processes such as Capabilities 
Based Planning, the Expeditionary Force Development System, Capabilities Based 
Assessment, and the Total Force Structure Process are also reviewed and examined.  The 
function this study will serve is to provide the leadership within the Total Force Structure 
Division with recommendations for any potential improvements that can be made to the 
troop-to-task analysis methodology.  
1. Background 
The Total Force Structure Division (TFSD) is a branch of the Marine Corps 
Combat Development Directorate (CDD) at the Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC) located onboard Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.  
According to Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5311.1D, force structure “represents the total 
requirement for the number of billets and items of equipment necessary to accomplish the 
Marine Corps Mission Essential Tasks (METs).”  One of the many functions of the TFSD 
is to conduct an annual Uncompensated Review Board (URB), which analyzes and 
prioritizes all Marine Corps requests for uncompensated force structure.  Because the 
requests come from other sources within the Marine Corps, the URB requires initial 
methods to review the requests and make determinations as to which are supportable, 
which are not, and the associated trade-offs.  Before the URB conducts its own analyses 
of each of the requests is receives, it requires the requesting units to conduct a troop-to-
task analysis as justification for additional manpower.   
Leadership in the TFSD has determined that the troop-to-task analyses that are 
submitted are often subjective and lacking in the thoroughness of analysis desired.  The 
TFSD does not have the internal capacity to conduct the troop-to-task analyses 
themselves and must rely on the submissions received.  Instructions and a template 
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developed by the TFSD are provided to requesting units that detail the troop-to-task 
analysis process;  however the TFSD would like to know what, if any, other methodology 
exists in order to receive the level of analysis they desire.   
2. Research Questions 
Primary:  
• What is the Total Force Structure Division’s methodology for conducting 
a troop-to-task analysis, how is this process working in terms of meeting 
the Total Force Structure Division’s and the Marine Corps needs and 
requirements, and what are potential improvements? 
Secondary:   
• What aspects of other troop-to-task analysis solutions in use may be 
applicable towards improving the Total Force Structure Division’s troop-
to-task analysis? 
• What relationship does the troop-to-task process share with other Marine 
Corps processes, such as the Human Resource Development Process, 
Acquisition Process, Expeditionary Force Development Systems, etc? 
3. Benefits of the Study 
At the very least, the expectation for this thesis is to provide a reference for future 
manpower systems analysis students when studying the very complex and often 
convoluted Marine Corps force structure and manpower planning processes that occur 
within the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.  Ideally, this study will also 
result in a clarification and analysis of the troop-to-task analysis process for the TFSD 
and provide recommendations for further improvement.   
B. RESEARCH METHODS 
1. Organizational Systems and Theory Models 
The most comprehensive and comprehensible way to describe the troop-to-task 
analysis methodology is to examine how it is used within the Total Force Structure 
Process (TFSP) and how both the TFSP and TFSD function as organizational systems 
using established organizational theory and models.  Because both the inputs to and 
outputs from the TFSP produce Marine Corps wide effects, it is also necessary to 
examine Marine Corps organizational structures both above and below the TFSP.  
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Established theorists featured in the discussion are Henry Mintzberg, Nancy Roberts, 
Davis Nadler and Michael Tushman, and James Thompson. 
2. Supporting Methods 
The primary sources used for research of the Marine Corps force structure 
processes were Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5311.1D, Total Force Structure Process, and 
MCO 3900.15B, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System.  Initial 
background and systems overview were provided through unstructured interviews with 
TFSD’s Director Mr. Kevin Herrmann, Deputy Director Mr. Lonnie Sanders, and 
Operations Officer Ms. Cynthia Cheek.  Further sources of information included Major 
Bill Ramsey, Major Gregory Wardman, Captain Shawn Sanders, and numerous 
conversations over a four month span with Major Joel Hoffman.  Captain James Rowlett 
provided copious internal briefs, documents and presentations and Information 
Technology Specialist, Mr. Chris Leubner provided valuable assistance with Internet 
conductivity and remote access to the TFSD’s Share Point site. 
Other valuable sources of information about systems outside the TFSP came from 
Lieutenant Colonel Albert Moseley, National Plans Branch of the Strategy and Plans 
Division of Headquarters Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations and instructors 
Mr. Thomas Washburn and Mr. David Retherford of the Army Force Management 
School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 
A number of Web sites such as the Marine Corps’ https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/ 
and http://www.marines.mil/Pages/Default.aspx as well as the Army’s Force Structure 
Management School at http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/ provided useful publications 
and information about organizational structure and doctrine. 
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
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Chapter II: Organizational Theory and Models 
This chapter encompasses the literature review and gives descriptions of several 
different theories and models used in organizational systems and process analysis.  It is 
intended to serve a backdrop by which to refer to in the following chapters.   
Chapter III: Overview of the Marine Corps Total Force Structure Process  
This chapter describes and examines the overlapping Marine Corps force structure 
management processes in terms of system inputs, throughputs, and outputs.  It also begins 
the initial discussion of where the troop-to-task analysis fits in and what purpose it 
serves.    
Chapter IV: The Total Force Structure Division’s Troop-to-Task Analysis 
This chapter describes in depth the methodology used to conduct a troop-to-task 
analysis, who performs them, and what function they serve in the TFSP. 
Chapter V: Analysis  
This chapter describes the Marine Corps processes using the theories from 
Chapter II.  It discusses how the TFSD both does and does not fit into the standard 
organizational theories and how this may affect its operations and efficiency.  It also 
highlights some strengths and weaknesses of the conduct of the TFSD’s troop-to-task 
analysis methodology. 
Chapter VI: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The final chapter frames any policy or process concerns as observations and 
provides alternative courses of action and recommendations for system/process 
improvement. 
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND MODELS 
To begin dissecting an organizational system or process, it is necessary to first 
examine existing organizational theory and models in order to establish a common 
descriptive language.  This chapter provides an overview of Mintzberg’s theory of 
organizational configurations and compositions, helpful in understanding the interplay 
among an array of environmental and organizational factors.  Also described are an 
organizational Systems model and an additional Configuration Model designed to 
accommodate public and defense agencies. These models provide generally accepted 
theoretical foundations needed to analyze complex military and bureaucratic 
organizations.  Additionally, the models and configurations are regularly used in the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy’s organizational systems management 
coursework.  The theories discussed in this chapter are then used in the remaining 
chapters to describe and analyze the various processes that structure and influence the 
troop-to-task analysis. 
A. MINTZBERG’S THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Having published 15 books and written over 150 articles, Henry Mintzberg is a 
prominent forerunner and renowned researcher in business and public sector management 
and organizational design.  As such, his theory of organizational structure is a natural 
starting point for any organizational process analysis.  According to his theory, the basic 
design of organizations is found within five kinds of organizational configurations, each 
made up of five parts, and each using one or more of five different mechanisms of 
coordination.1 
1. The Five Organizational Configurations  
Mintzberg claims that “like all phenomena from atoms to stars—the 
characteristics of organizations fall into natural clusters, or configurations”.2  If these 
                                                 
1 Henry Mintzberg, http://www.mintzberg.org/about.htm (accessed 12 January 2010).  
2 Henry Mintzberg, "Organizational design: fashion or fit?." Harvard Business Review 59, no. 1 
(1981): 103. 
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clusters of characteristics do not fit the actual structure and function of the organization, 
the organization may fail to ‘cohere’ or operate with optimal efficiency.  The basic 
configuration determines which of the five components and five coordination 
mechanisms interact with various situational elements, e.g., age and size, technical 
system, environment, and power.3  The five basic configurations are: 
a. Simple Structure  
As the name suggests, this is the simplest and least complicated of the 
forms.  Typical of enterprising young entrepreneurial companies, these organizations are 
characterized by a loose division of labor, an informal decision making process where 
power is centralized by a single individual, and a dynamic environment in which each 
player is able to fully comprehend the roles of the other players. 
b. Machine Bureaucracy  
This organizational configuration is a natural offspring of the Industrial 
Revolution and mass production firms, such as factories, auto, airline and postal 
industries, and fast-food conglomerates.  McDonalds is run like a machine with codified 
rules for storing, preparing, and cooking its products, thereby ensuring consistency and 
predictability of product and service worldwide. Because this type of configuration 
depends on the standardization of work processes, there tends to be a sharp distinction 
between line and staff, with a fairly linear and formal chain of authority permeated by 
strict rules and regulations, e.g., military organizations can be described as highly 
programmed, well-oiled machines. 
c. Professional Bureaucracy   
Large, complex, and stable like a machine bureaucracy, but much more 
decentralized due to professionals at the working core.  The professional bureaucracy 
places less emphasis on direct lines of supervision in favor of a more democratic, 
                                                 
3 Henry Mintzberg, "Structure in 5’s: A Synthesis of the Research on Organizational Design." 
Management Science 26, no. 3 (1980): 322–339. 
 7
autonomous, and self-administering arrangement.  Outputs are predominately the results 
of professionals who obtained their skills elsewhere, e.g., doctors in hospitals and/or 
professors in universities.  A distinction of this configuration is that one cannot manage 
professionals like machines.  These are often highly skilled people who must be given 
considerable control over their own work, i.e., the organization surrenders a good deal of 
its power to the professional themselves, and also to the associations and institutions that 
select and train them.  This configuration can also be applicable to craft production and 
social work firms.  Note that many fields attempt to professionalize and thereby gain the 
considerable benefits of autonomy and a minuscule need to be supervised, e.g., military 
officer and senior enlisted groups, engineers, accountants, etc. 
d. Divisionalized Form 
This is when a centralized headquarters oversees a mostly autonomous set 
of divisions. There is typically little interdependence or coordination between the 
divisions, thus the primary concern is product control between them.  Often the divisions 
are so independent as to each create their own mini-configuration.  This configuration is 
seen in the largest of corporations, essentially overgrown machine bureaucracies that 
produce a diverse array of products and/or services or serve a number of different 
markets.  
e. Adhocracy 
Adhocracy is the least formal configuration, serving complex yet very 
dynamic organizations, often through the work of interacting project teams.  It requires a 
level of sophisticated decentralization that defies formal management styles in favor of 
working groups and creative brainstorming.  This form is a relatively recent, in vogue, 
phenomenon that often gives way to a more formalized structure as the organization ages.  






mutual adjustment through the informal communication and interaction of competent 
experts.”4  This configuration includes the film industry and even the central aspects of 
guerrilla warfare. 
2. The Five Basic Components  
These are the “parts” of an organization, shown in Figure 1.  The purpose of each 
of these is to provide a division of labor and describe who performs what kind of work.  
How an organization utilizes or values each determines what kind of “cluster” that 
particular organization best describes. 
a. Strategic Apex 
This is the individual or top management primarily accountable for the 
oversight of the entire system.  The apex tends to be large in machine bureaucracies as 
leaders pull to centralize decision making, yet small in professional bureaucracies where 
power resides in the professionals at the operating core. 
b. Operating Core 
Those workers producing the basic goods and services of the organization 
comprise the core, be they unskilled labor at McDonalds, or highly skilled professionals 
in a hospital or university.  Again, the operating core tends to be large in machine 
bureaucracy due to the standardization of work processes.  
c. Middle Line 
This refers to managers and supervisors who provide lines of control 
between the strategic apex and the operating core.  Again, this component is typically 
large in a machine bureaucracy, as many managers are needed to handle conflicts 
between and among the other major components. 
                                                 
4 Henry Mintzberg, "Organizational design: fashion or fit?" Harvard Business Review 59, no. 1 (1981): 
111. 
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d. Support Staff 
This is the group or groups of staff that provide indirect support to the rest 
of the organization, such as payroll, human resources, the mailroom, etc.  Both machine 
and professional bureaucracies would tend to have relatively large support staffs. 
e. Technostructure 
Analysts who provide direct support in the form of formal planning and 
control of the work of others.  Unlike support staff, the technostructure provides technical 
oversight and does not usually perform the work themselves.  Technocratic controls 
would be sizable in machine bureaucracies and small in professional bureaucracies: the 
former to make and enforce many rules and regulations on a large, standardized 
workforce, and the latter because professionals are skilled people who must be given 
considerable control over their own work. 
As depicted, the strategic apex is the smallest component overseeing the 
entire system.  It is connected directly and sequentially to the middle management and 
operating core of the organization to depict an uninterrupted chain-of-command in most 
of the configurations.  On the sides, the support staff and technostructure do not have the 
same direct link, but provide peripheral influence in a more indirect fashion.5 
 
                                                 
5 Bradley D. Bruner, “An Organizational Analysis of the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division (N13),” Master’s  thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998: 5–7. 
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Figure 1.   Model of Organizational Components (From Mintzberg, 1980) 
3. The Five Mechanisms of Coordination 
If the purpose of each of the parts is to accomplish a different kind of work, then 
it follows that there are also a number of different ways in which this work is 
coordinated.  Mintzberg’s rule of fives thus defines five ways in which each of an 
organization’s parts coordinate tasks.6  The framework of the five configurations can help 
managers understand how their different parts are organized and fit together—or refuse 
to.  The point is that leaders and managers can improve their organizational designs by 
considering the different pulls their organizations experience and the configurations 
toward which they are drawn.  Another point is not which configuration one has; rather, it 
is that one achieves configuration.  Mintzberg clarifies by writing that “we would do 
better to spend our time trying not to convert our machine bureaucracies into something 
else but to ensure that they work effectively as the bureaucracies they are meant to be.”7 
                                                 
6 Henry Mintzberg, "Structure in 5’s: A Synthesis of the Research on Organizational Design." 
Management Science 26, no. 3 (1980). 
7 Henry Mintzberg, "Organizational design: fashion or fit?" Harvard Business Review 59, no. 1 (1981): 
114. 
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a. Direct Supervision   
One person directs the tasks and takes responsibility for the work of those 
who are receiving the tasking, i.e., the pull to centralize by top management.  An example 
of this is how a unit’s commanding officer provides centralization by directing orders 
down the chain of command.  
b. Standardization of Work Processes 
The coordination of work is not done by any one individual, but under an 
established set of rules or guidelines, typically imposed by the technostructure, i.e., the 
pull to formalize behaviors and processes.  Marine Corps mission statements contain a 
concept of employment which functions in this way by directing and standardizing how 
that organization is to utilize its personnel and equipment in order to accomplish the 
assigned mission. 
c. Standardization of Outputs 
Similar to the standardization of work processes by the technostructure, 
but instead of coordination of process, the coordination is at the end product through 
specific product performance measures.  Mission statements, and to some extent the 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Manual, function as a standardization of outputs 
by the use of descriptions of what the finished product, i.e., mission success or a fully 
trained individual “looks like.” 
d. Standardization of Skills 
Instead of an imposition of external measures, coordination is through the 
standardized training of workers and typically internalized prior to the work beginning.  
The Marine Corps MOS schools serve the purpose of provided a common standardization 
of specific skill sets to all Marines prior to their first Fleet assignment.  This is intended 
to develop the common educational and technical background needed to function in that 
occupational field. 
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e. Mutual Adjustment 
This occurs when workers coordinate their own work, usually through 
internal informal communication.  Working groups often function in this way once the 
initial goal or task has been assigned. 
To summarize, the central purpose of structure is to coordinate the work 
divided in a number of ways.  How that coordination is accomplished, by whom and with 
what, dictates what the organization will look like.  Based on which mechanisms of 
coordination an organization practices and the environmental situation it finds itself in, 
the essential element is extent of fit.  The configuration construct means that all the 
elements interact in a system, not causing another, instead, all influencing each other 
interactively.  It is reasonable that an organizational structure naturally evolves over time 
based on many variables.  But an organization cannot be all things to all people.  “When 
managers and organizational designers try to mix and match the elements of different 
ones (configurations), they may emerge with a misfit that, like an ill-cut piece of 
clothing, won’t wear very well.”8  A simplified table describing these differences appears 
in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.   Summary of Mintzberg’s Organizational Structure Theory (From Bruner, 1998) 
                                                 
8 Henry Mintzberg, "Organizational design: fashion or fit?" Harvard Business Review 59, no. 1 (1981): 
103. 
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B. SYSTEMS MODELS 
Mintzberg’s model of an organization’s five basic components combines several 
theories into configurations as abstract ideals or simplifications of the complex world of 
structure, leading to how an organization is structured internally.  This theory provides a 
set of tools with which to describe how the parts of an organization interact and 
coordinate with each other.  These are also configurations of situation as well as 
structure, e.g., age and size, technical system, environment and power.  What the theory 
is really saying is that harmony among important parts or components may be the key to 
organizational success, i.e., consistency and congruence are what matters most.  Because 
any troop-to-task analysis is heavily influenced by the surrounding environment, it is 
important to extend the configuration vocabulary to include organizational systems 
theory.  Both contain the same central hypothesis:  The fit of the components determines 
performance. 
This section describes organizations through the use of a systems model 
framework.  While several variations exist, this discussion will focus on two:  one of the 
original Congruence models from Nadler and Tushman, and the specific Organizational 
Systems Framework designed by Nancy Roberts, and taught at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
1. Characteristics of Systems Models 
Thinking of an organization as a system allows for further examination of the 
dynamic flow of environmental factors through the organization and the resulting 
influence back on the environment.  Nadler and Tushman define a system as “a set of 
interrelated elements”.  As one element changes, it has numerous effects on all the other 
elements.  According to systems theory, an open system takes environmental influences 
as inputs, does something with these influences during a throughput stage, and then puts 
products back into the environment as outputs.  Because any troop-to-task analysis is 




organization and the external environment, the process can be considered an open system 
where feedback loops further influence the system.  Nadler and Tushman detail a few 
other basic open system characteristics9: 
a. Internal Interdependence 
The parts of a system are interconnected.  This characteristic describes 
how change in one component or subcomponent of a system of an organizational system 
affects other components or subcomponents. 
b. Capacity for Feedback 
Systems have the potential to use information about the outputs to go back 
and control the direction of the system.  Just because organizations have this capacity 
however, does not mean that they use it to self-correct problems or inefficiencies.   
c. Equilibrium 
Systems constantly strive towards balance, or equilibrium.  If an action or 
event puts an organizational system out of balance, the system will try to correct itself 
back to a balanced state.   
d. Equifinality 
This characteristic describes how there is no one right way for an open 
system to organize.  Different configurations can independently develop the same end-
state, none of which is incorrect. 
e. Adaptation 
If any open system cannot maintain balance between inputs or outputs, it 
will become obsolete.  Because the environment changes the inputs, an organization 
exhibits adaptability to these evolving forces. 
                                                 
9 David A. Nadler and Michael L., Tushman, "Organization, Congruence, and Effectiveness." 
Organizational Dynamics 9 no. 2 (1980): 35–51. 
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2. Organizational Systems Framework 
Roberts expands the organization systems structure even further.  In her model, 
(Figure 2), she breaks down the inputs, throughputs, and outputs into detailed subsystems 
and design variables as described below.10 
                                                 
10 Bradley D. Bruner, “An Organizational Analysis of the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division (N13),” thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998: 10–13. 
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Includes all the environmental factors that provide the context within 
which an organizational system functions.  These can include the political, economic, 
social, and technological environment, the individual history of the organization, and the 
resources with which the organization can access. 
Key success factors:   
These are those factors that are needed in order for an organization to be 
successful.  There are readily apparent differences between key success factors of non-
profit and government organizations and private business organizations. 
System direction:   
These are the internal factors that drive an organization; including mission 
statements, directives, strategies, mandates, visions, and goals. 
b. Design Factors That Perform the Throughputs 
Tasks/Jobs:   
These describe the work to actually be performed.  Understanding the 
nature, specification, and differentiation of the work contributes greatly to the 
comprehension of the tasks to be performed. 
Technology:   
A tool used in the throughput stage to process inputs into outputs.  
Includes the physical facilities and equipment, but does not include information systems. 
Structure:  
 Structure includes the divisions, departments, working groups, and 




People:   
Not only the workers, but also their knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSAs) contribute to a system’s design. 
Processes:   
The necessarily subcomponents and all the tasks they entail, of an 
organizational system.  This includes human resource management, financial 
management, and the internal communication systems. 
Culture:  
Culture is the prevalent norms and values that drive an organization.  An 




What an organization produces in terms of goods and/or services.  This 
also includes the way in which the goods and services produced are measured. 
Outcomes:  
In addition to goods and services, there are implications and 
consequences, good or bad, which are projected back onto the environment. 
C. THOMPSON’S TYPOLOGY  
The final model to be discussed was created by James D. Thompson, another 
early sociological thinker and forerunner in the study of organizational science.  The 
model describes three kinds of interdependence between components in an organizational 
system.  It then describes three different kinds of coordination that typically occurs for  
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each kind of interdependence.11  These terms will be important for the description and 
forthcoming analysis of how the Total Force Structure Division and other key players in 
the troop-to-task analysis process interact. 
1. Interdependence 
a. Pooled Interdependence 
Occurs in an organization where each of the divisions works 
independently of one another towards a common goal.  The success or failure of one may 
not directly influence another, but it will influence the organization as a whole.  
University professors typically have pooled interdependence where some coordination 
always applies, but each instructor teaches their individual discipline fairly independent 
of the other disciplines. 
b. Sequential Interdependence 
Can be like pooled interdependence where divisions work independently, 
however the distinction is that one division’s outputs become another division’s inputs.  
Production lines are an obvious example.  Note how the level of interdependence is 
increasing from pooled. 
c. Reciprocal Interdependence 
This is exhibited by complete interdependence amongst an organization’s 
divisions.  All members in these types of relationships interact on a regular basis with the 
rest of the organization.  This is the most complex of the three, often requiring much 
greater coordination based on the necessity of high interdependence among relevant 
players. 
                                                 
11 James D. Thompson, Organizations and Beyond, ed. William A. Rushing, Mayer N. Zald (D.C.: 
Heath and Company, 1976): 41–43. 
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2. Coordination 
a. Standardization  
This type of coordination uses a set of rules and regulations by which 
everyone is expected to follow.  It implies a relatively stable and repetitive environment 
that does not lend often to exceptions. 
b. Coordination by Plan   
This level of coordination is composed less of rules, but more by 
schedules that engender further governance.  It allows for more dynamic environments by 
setting guidelines from which to respond. 
c. Coordination by Mutual Adjustment 
Is the most flexible coordination method and is achieved through 
continuous interaction and feedback amongst the members.  As such, it also requires the 
most communication capability. 
Because of the easily understood parallels, Thompson’s typology can be 
compared to how certain sports teams function and as such is frequently used in business 
analogies.  A simple overview follows in Table 2 with Thompson’s types of coordination 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE 
PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Total Force Structure Division’s mission is as follows: 
Total Force Structure Division (TFSD), in conjunction with Advocates, 
operating forces, and other Marine Corps agencies, develops and 
maintains the Marine Corps Force Structure, allocates resources to provide 
a balanced and capable force, and plans and implements future force 
structure changes in order to build capability-based organizations that 
accomplish the Marine Corps' mission essential tasks fulfilling its Title 10 
requirements.12  
In order to understand the Total Force Structure Division’s troop-to-task analysis 
process requirements, it is necessary to first examine how the analysis functions within 
the larger context of the Total Force Structure Process (TFSP) and TFSD’s role under the 
Deputy Commandant of Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I).  Essentially, 
the TFSP is a subsystem of the Capabilities Based Analysis (CBA), which is a subsystem 
of the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS).  These interacting agencies and 
subcomponents reflect the earlier literature explanation regarding the complexity often 
surrounding hierarchies of interacting systems, i.e., the inter-relationships among force 
structure planning, development, and documentation systems.  This chapter attempts to 
clarify the complicated network of products, functions, and responsibilities that flow 
through the TFSD using Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5311.1D, the DC  CD&I’s 
instruction for the TFSP and MCO 3900.15B, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine 
Corps’ instruction to the DC CD&I for the conduct of the Expeditionary Force 
Development System.  The following description is also based on internal service briefs 
and semi-structured interviews conducted with civilian and military personnel working 
within the TFSD.   
                                                 
12 Lonnie Sanders, “TFSD Overview,” TFSD Internal Brief, dated 13 September 2008. 
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B. BACKGROUND AND PARALLEL PLANNING PROCESSES 
1. Purpose of the Total Force Structure Process 
According to MCO 5311.1D, the Commander’s Intent of the Total Force 
Structure Process is to integrate billet and equipment requirements in order to develop 
and document force structure for the entire Marine Corps.  It further defines force 
structure as “a representation of the total requirement for the number of billets and items 
of equipment necessary to accomplish Marine Corps mission essential tasks”.  In 
manpower systems analysis terminology, “billet” as used here is synonymous with the 
term “manpower”.  Manpower is the personnel strength required to operate, train, and 
maintain a system, also commonly referred to as the “spaces” of an organization.  This is 
not to be confused with the “faces” of an organization, which is the inventory of people 
with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to fill those spaces.  TFSD works 
strictly with the spaces function of manpower management while other Marine Corps 
organizations, primarily Marine Corps Headquarters, Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
(M&RA), function in the role of filling these spaces with the available personnel in 
addition to their initial recruitment and subsequent management, career progression, et 
cetera.13   
2. Integration of Planning Programs 
The Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition System 
Operation, signed 12 May 2003 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, signed 11 May 2005 
established the requirement for all service branches of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
to transition to a Capabilities Based Planning (CBP) process from the previous 
Requirements Based Planning process.  The change was made in order to provide 
consistency for, and more efficiently allocate, limited resources across all DoD service 
components.14  According to these letters of instruction, the new CBP process is to utilize 
                                                 
13 Sheryl Fitzgerald, “Manpower 101 Brief,” M&RA Internal Brief, 19 March 2009. 
14 Lisa Lorino, “United States Marine Corps’ PPBE A Process in Change” GB4053, Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy, paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 20 March 2006, 4. 
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a top-down approach, originating from national and DoD guidance, as shown in the 
inputs section to the TFSP.  In accordance with this new policy, the DC CD&I was tasked 
to be the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Integrator and as such, has 
responsibility for the entire CBP process.  The MAGTF Integrator assignment led to a 
Marine Requirement Oversight Council (MROC) decision in September 2005 that 
authorized DC CD&I to restructure commands to better support MAGTF integration of 
USMC war fighting capabilities development.  This restructuring in 2005 is the current 
command structure in use today.15  See Appendix A for current organizational charts. 
Capabilities Based Planning is conducted through the use of the four-phased 
Expeditionary Force Development System, which is synchronized and run cyclically with 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) and the Defense 
Acquisition System.16  As the name suggests, the PPBES is also a four-phased planning 
process; but unlike the more linear nature of the EFDS, its phases run concurrently in a 
two-year cycle, while simultaneously executing the current fiscal year’s budget, 
defending the following fiscal year’s budget, and developing the budget for two fiscal 
years out.  (This means that at any one time, planners are working with at least four years 
worth of budgeting.)  The purpose of the PPBES is to provide each branch of the DoD 
with a structured decision making budgeting tool that best utilizes their limited fiscal 
resources while still meeting strategic policies, priorities, and objectives.17  For the 
purposes of this study, the programming phase is the only one needing further 
explanation as it is the primary link between the planning products produced by the 
EFDS and the Marine Corps’ PPBES process.  
The programming phase of the PPBES is where programs—the personnel, 
equipment, and services the Marine Corps needs to meet its strategic objectives—are 
aligned with the allocation of resources.  The product of this phase is the Programming 
Objective Memorandum (POM), arguably the most important planning document in 
                                                 
15 MARADMIN 621/05, DC CDI Reorganization. 
16 MCO 5311.1D, Total Force Structure Process, 3. 
17 Douglas Brook, “Introduction to PPBES” GB4053, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. 
Naval Postgraduate School, Lecture 6-1, Winter 2009. 
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military budgeting, that outlines and details the resource allocation for the duration of the 
next budget cycle for the entire Marine Corps.18  The entire EFDS process produces the 
analysis and subsequent planning products that are used in the PPBES programming 
phase in order to develop the POM.  A depiction of how the EFDS cycle aligns with the 
PPBES is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Alignment of the EFDS and PPBES processes (From MCO 3900.15B) 
 
 
                                                 
18 Tiffany Hill, “An Analysis of the Organizational Structures Supporting PPBE within the Military 
Departments,” thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008. 
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According to MCO 3900.15B, the Commander’s Intent of the EFDS is to 
facilitate the development and timely delivery of fully integrated war fighting, associated 
support, and infrastructure non-war fighting capabilities to the operating forces.  A brief 
overview of each phase is as follows: 
a. Phase I  
The Capabilities Analysis phase is a two-step process that identifies 
capabilities and associated gaps and excesses in those capabilities at the MAGTF level to 
be addressed in the next POM.  It is conducted by the numerous Integration Divisions, 
parallel in organizational structure with the TFSD, under the Capabilities Development 
Directorate (CDD) from October of odd-numbered years until October of even-numbered 
years with the assistance of various Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).  In practice, the first 
step is a continuous process while the second step is initiated in April and concluded in 
October of even-numbered calendar years.19   
b. Phase II  
The Solutions Analysis phase is a three-step process that provides further 
in-depth analysis of each of the gaps and excesses identified in Phase I and then identifies 
possible solutions and recommends solution strategies.  Any specific requirements and 
initiatives that are sufficiently mature enough for funding are identified and prioritized 
with existing requirements and sent on to Phase III for consideration for POM funding.  
The timeline for the three sub-phases are October odd-numbered year though January 
even-numbered year, February through May, and June through August of odd-numbered 
years.20   
c. Phase III 
The Program Development phase is the intersection between the EFDS 
and PPBES processes and links planning with budget in order to develop a fiscally 
balanced program designed to sufficiently meet Marine Corps capabilities objectives.  It 
                                                 
19 MCO 3900.15B, Enc.1, 1–3. 
20 MCO 3900.15B, Enc.2, 1–2. 
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is during this overlapping of the two program phases that the Warfighting Investment 
Program Evaluation Board, chaired by the DC CD&I, uses a nine step process with the 
requirements products developed during Phase II, to develop the Marine Corps POM.   
The POM is then forwarded to the Commandant for recommendation to the Secretary of 
the Navy for allocation of all Marine Corps resources.  The POM is developed during 
even-numbered years and encompasses a six-year period.  A five-year Program Review is 
conducted during the odd-numbered years to evaluate the existing programs, their 
progress, and continued relevance between POM years.  It functions as an opportunity to 
make any timely changes or adjustments to emerging requirements that cannot be delayed 
until the next POM cycle.  POM development is an inter-department joint effort and is 
executed per the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources guidance.21   
d. Phase IV 
The Capabilities Implementation and Transition Phase takes the approved 
POM and identifies, fields, and transitions it into fully integrated solutions for the 
operating forces and support elements.  POM approved non-material initiatives are 
developed by the appropriate agency for implementation and approved materiel 
initiatives are managed by the event-driven Defense Acquisition System.  Funding from 
current year budget resources may also be used if available during this phase.22 
The complexity of both the EFDS and the PPBES is such that a thesis 
could be written on each.  This overview has been provided because there is no simple 
comprehensive description for what the TFSD does without examining how the TFSP 
functions within the larger context of Marine Corps capabilities planning, integration, and 
budgeting.  In compliance with the DoD’s increasing emphasis on joint capabilities and 
integration, the entire EFDS process serves as the Marine Corps vehicle for the mandated 
Capabilities Based Planning per the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System.  The remainder of this planning programs review focuses on a segment of CBP, 
called the Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), which is a 24-month process captured 
                                                 
21 MCO 3900.15B, Enc. 3, 1–2. 
22 MCO 3900.15B, Enc. 4, 1. 
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specifically during Phases I and II of the EFDS.  The CBA functions as the link between 
the entire EFDS and the TFSP.   Because the TFSP uses the same tools developed during 
the CBA, it is important to understand the connection between their overlapping products 
and processes.  For simplicity, another way to think of the TFSP is as a condensed, more 
timely and immediate planning tool outside but in conjunction with the lengthy and 
deliberate EFDS planning cycle.23    
3. Shared Tools 
This section describes the tools produced by the CBA (phases I and II of the 
EFDS), who is responsible for producing them, and how the TFSD uses them—including 
applicability.  As many of these same tools are used directly or indirectly in the TFSD’s 
troop-to-task analysis, this section also serves as a useful familiarization prior to Chapter 
IV’s description of the troop-to-task analysis process. 
a. Phase I, Step 1 
The first step of the EFDS cycle or the Capabilities Based Assessment is 
to conduct a Functional Area Analysis (FAA).  The FAA develops the framework of 
MAGTF capabilities and tasks needed to complete missions in order to determine 
potential gaps and excesses.  In a nine step process beginning with the identification of 
necessary strategic documents, it codifies the conditions under which Marine Corps 
Tasks (MCTs) are to be performed and the standards to which they should be performed.  
The conditions are those variables that an individual, unit, or system has to operate under 
and can be military, physical, civil, or from any number of sources that effect the ability 
to perform an assigned task.  Standards refers to both the criteria, or actual threshold to 
which a task is expected to be performed, and the measures of how performance is 
rated.24  
 
                                                 
23 MCO 5311.1D,.3. 
24 MCO 3900.15B, Enc.1. 
 30
An intermediate step is the identification of MAGTF capabilities 
statements, which are any documents that provide descriptions of capabilities required to 
execute Marine Corps operating and enabling concepts.  The identified capabilities are 
then matched to required MCTs as identified in the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL).  
The MCTL contains the Core Mission Essential Tasks (METs), that are what drive the 
TFSP.  At the completion of the nine steps, the final product is a prioritized list of 
MAGTF capabilities, called the MAGTF Capabilities List (MCL) that becomes the input 
to the TFSP.25  The process of moving from National Military Strategy to the MCTL is 
shown in Figure 4. 
                                                 
25 MCO 3900. 15B, Enc. 1. 
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Figure 4.   National Strategy to the MCTL (From MCO 3900.15B) 
The FAA is an on-going process.  However, a cut-off date for the 
submission of FAA changes to be included in phase I, step 2, is made by the MAGTF 
Integration Division (MID) and published in the first quarter of even calendar years.   
Even though the War Fighting Function (WFF) Integration Divisions (IDs) in the 
Capabilities Development Directorate oversee the entire phase I process, the FAA is 
actually conducted by the G3/G5 branch of MCCDC.26 
                                                 
26 MCO 3900.15B, Enc. 1. 
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b. Phase 1, Step 2 
The second step of Phase 1 is the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA).  Its 
purpose is to describe any gaps and existing excesses based  on comparisons between 
current operational capabilities and the capability standards as set forth during the FAA.  
This phase is conducted by the WFF IDs, with assistance from various subject matter 
experts, by determining how well the MCTs can be performed against the standards set 
forth in the FAA.  The gaps are to be expressed in operational terms; for example a 
weapon system with insufficient range would be identified as “range” or situations of 
information being available, but tardy would be identified as “information tardiness”.  
Finally, a risk assessment is conducted in order to determine the impact of not provided 
the capability as specified during the FAA on the MAGTF.  The product of this phase is a 
prioritized list of gaps requiring a solution and excesses for redistribution called the 
MAGTF Gap List (MGL) for consideration in the next POM phase.27 
Figure 5 provides an overview of both steps of the entire phase.  Of note, 
are the strategic and joint inputs into the process and the repository of its results called 
the Capabilities Based Assessment Database.  What is not on this diagram are any 
contributions that may come from the TFSP, such as current force structure, Universal 
Needs Statements (UNS), uncompensated structure requests, and Table of Organization 




                                                 
27 MCO 3900.15B, Enc. 1. 
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Figure 5.   Overview of EFDS Phase I (From MCO 3900.15B) 
c. Phase II, Step 1 
The purpose of this step is to conduct a Functional Solutions Analysis 
(FSA), using what is referred to as a DOTMLPF Analysis, in order to find materiel and 
non-materiel solutions for the gaps identified in the MGL from Phase I using the 
DOTMLPF pillars. The DOTMLPF are the seven pillars of Marine Corps combat 
development: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities.  This step is conducted through the use of DOTMLPF Working 
Groups (DWGs), populated with stakeholder participation from across the Marine Corps 
and organized and chaired by each of the WFF IDs.  Analysts from the CBA Branch, 
within the MAGTF Integration Division, provide technical capabilities support, DWG 
Charters, and conduct an instructional DWG workshop prior to the start of each DWG.  
An intermediate analysis process, called the Analysis of Materiel/Non-Materiel 
Approaches (AMA), identifies materiel solutions if non-materiel solutions are not 
sufficient to eliminate gaps and a conducts a risk assessment of each identified option.  
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The product resulting from the AMA is a prioritized list of materiel solutions (or 
combination of materiel solutions) and a ranking of how well each is expected to fulfill 
the capability gap.  The product from this step is the Solution Planning Directive (SPD) 
that assigns responsibility to areas that address the capability gaps and thus becomes the 
plan to mitigate or eliminate them using the DOTMLPF pillars.  Included in the SPD is a 
Course of Action recommendation for the best solution using data from the pre-
acquisition process.28  After the completion of the SPD by the Integration Division’s 
DWGs, another standing DWG, chaired by the Director of the Total Force Structure 
Division, completes the capabilities development integration by conducting a final 
assessment of supportability of the SPD across all DOTMLPF pillars prior to being sent 
to the MROC.29 
d. Phase II, Step 2 
In this step, the CBA Branch distributes the results of the SPD to each 
specific ID, headquarters, or command that is identified to take some sort of action, 
implements deadlines, and oversees the progress.  Actions that are applicable specifically 
to the TFSP are those that require adjustments to how the Marine Corps uses the 
DOTMLPF pillars, such as revisions to doctrinal publications or training capabilities or 
adjustments to the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).30 
e. Phase II, Step 3 
The final step of the CBA process develops the MAGTF Requirements 
List (MRL) in order to provide decision makers with a prioritized list of current programs 
of records (PORs) and new initiatives that will be considered in the upcoming POM 
cycle.  Guidance and methodology is provided by the CBA Branch and prioritization is 
conducted by the DWGs, with final approval granted by the Director of CDD.  Its  
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purpose it to give guidance to decision-makers in order for them to most effectively 
resource the Marine Corps’ most urgent solutions to capability gaps.31  An overview of 
all three steps is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   Overview of EFDS Phase II (From MCO 3900.15B) 
                                                 
31 MCO 3900.15B, Enc.2. 
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The tools and products of the Capabilities Based Assessment described in 
this section outline the TFSP’s primary function in and services provided to the EFDS 
and the PPBES.  While Marine Corps doctrine does not define a specific application of 
the troop-to-task analysis at this stage in the force structure analytical processes, it does 
examine and validate those products that a troop-to-task analysis relies upon. 
A synopsis of the CBA process and interactions is provided in Figure 7.  
This “cheat sheet” might be useful to refer back to in order to keep track of which 
analysis and accompanying product occurs in which phase. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Overlapping processes 
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4.  Approval Authority and Supporting Participants 
A number of participants from all over the Marine Corps play various 
contributing roles in the entire CBA process, and indirectly through these contributions, 
provide subject matter expertise that is then infused into the TFSP.  In this way, the TFSP 
does not occur “in a vacuum.”  While not all participants detailed below contribute to 
each and every step, those listed are approval bodies and the major influences from the 
FMF that provide planning insight, guidance, and common sense vetting into all Marine 
Corps planning processes.   
a. MROC32 
The mission of the Marine Requirements Oversight Council is to advise 
and assist the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the execution of his Title 10 USC and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibilities.  As such, it is the highest-level executive review 
board for the integration of the Marine Corps’ diverse institutional perspectives.  It is 
typically chaired by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC), but the 
CMC may act as chair for selected topics.  Either may designate associate members or 
invite non-voting guests, such as individuals from other Services.  In addition to the CMC 
(when chairing) and the ACMC, the other permanent voting board members are: 
• Director, Marine Corps Staff (DMCS) 
• Commander, Marine Forces Command (CMFC) 
• Counsel for the Commandant (CL) 
• Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC, M&RA) 
• Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DC, AVN) 
• Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC, PP&O) 
• Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (DC, I&L) 
• Deputy Commandant, CD&I 
• Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources (DC, P&R), also 
designated as the MROC Secretary. 
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Of note, the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources is 
the MROC Review Board Chairman, and the only non-voting permanent member. 
The DCs are also titled Proponents of their respective programs; for 
example, DC, CD&I is the EFDS and TFSP Proponent, DC, M&RA is the Marine 
Human Resources Development Process (HRDP) Proponent, and DC, P&R is the PPBES 
Proponent.  DCs for CD&I, PP&O, I&L, and AVN are also tasked with providing 
colonel-level or higher voting members to DC D&I’s annual Uncompensated Review 
Board (URB).  DCs for M&RA and P&R are required to provide colonel-level or higher 
non-voting representation.  In addition to service on the MROC, the DCs are also tasked 
with the responsibility of participating in all force structure DOTMLPF Assessments33 
Each of the force structure initiatives (products) that are developed in the 
CBA, EFDS, TFSP systems, must go before a MROC Review Board (MRB) and be 
approved by the MROC before reaching the CMC’s desk for final approval.  As the 
primary force structure approval authority, the MROC serves a vital role in any of the 
force structure, manpower, budgeting, and acquisitions processes. 
b. MAGTF Advocates34 
Also refers to the six Deputy Commandants listed above; however, the 
MAGTF Advocate title specifically refers to their capacity as a liaison between the 
MAGTF Operating Forces and Supporting Establishment and the various force structure 
process owners both within the EFDS and external to the Marine Corps.  While the most 
recent MROC charter, signed by CMC General Conway in July 2008, expands greatly 
upon the definitions of Advocate responsibilities from how they are listed below, the 
outdated MROC charter is referenced for the purpose of this review because it provides 
more succinct definitions.  As Advocates, these individuals are also responsible for a 
thorough review of all mission statements under their advocacy no less than every 4 
years35.  The MAGTF Advocate assignments are as follows: 
                                                 
33 MCO 5311.1D, 1–35. 
34 CMC Policy Memorandum 1-02, Enc.1, 3. 
35 MCO 5311.1D, 1–35. 
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• ACMC – for the Headquarters Marine Corps 
• DC, M&RA – for the Marine Corps Recruiting Command 
• DC, AVN – for the Aviation Combat Element 
• DC, PP&O – for the Ground Combat Element, Chemical/Biological 
Incident Response Force, Marine Corps Security Forces,  and the Marine 
Security Guard Battalion 
• DC, I&L – for the Combat Service Support Element, Installations, and 
Materiel Command 
• DC, CD&I – for the Command Element, the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, and Science and Technology 
c. Functional Advocates 
The functional advocates provide subject matter expertise at various levels 
of the many systems discussed in this study.  Of note are the first three listed, who are 
called upon frequently for input into force structure considerations.  The Directors of 
Intelligence and C4 are further tasked to provide colonel-level or higher non-voting 
member to the URB36.  They are: 
• Director, Intelligence (I) 
• Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) 
• Director, Administration and Resources (AR) 
• Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant (SJA) 
• Director, Public Affairs (PA) 
d. Warfighting Functions (WFF) IDs 
The Integration Divisions are under the Capabilities Development 
Directorate, parallel in hierarchy to the TFSD.  (See Appendix A for organizational flow 
charts.)  As mentioned previously, each of the IDs oversee many of the DOTMLPF 
Working Groups and organize the various levels of subject matter expertise into 
structured forums in order to reach mutually agreeable solutions across the Marine Corps. 
                                                 
36 MCO 5311.1D, 1–35. 
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e. MARFOR and Supporting Establishment Commanders 
The Commanders of Marine Forces (COMMARFORs) and the Supporting 
Establishment are integral in providing timely, operationally relevant support and 
expertise regarding manpower, equipment, logistics, and training for the warfighting 
requirements of the operating forces.  Like the advocates, they are regularly called upon 
to provide input and guidance into force structure DOTMLPF Assessments and 
DOTMLPF Working Group participation.  The Commanders MARFORCOM and 
MARFORPAC are specifically tasked to provide colonel-level or higher voting members 
to the URB.  Commander MARFORSOC must provide the same, non-voting member.37 
They are: 
• Commander Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) 
• Commander Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) 
• Commander Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) 
• Commander Marine Forces Special Operations Command 
(MARFORSOC)  
• Commander Marine Corps Systems Command  
(COMDRMARCORSYSCOM) 
• Commander Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) 
• Commanding General Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) 
• Commanding General Training and Education Command (TECOM) 
f. Combatant Commanders 
Combatant Commanders are the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level 
and below commanders.  They are typically either tasked from higher with providing 
feedback to the planning process or they identify force structure problems within their 
own ranks and send proposed changes up the chain of command. 
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g. Occupational Field and MOS Managers, Billet Sponsors38 
Occupational Field (OccFld) managers are the Deputy Commandant, 
HQMC division director, the CG of Marine Corps Recruiting Command, or the CG of 
Marine Corps Systems Command.  The OccFld managers are assigned annually and as 
such have purview over a grouping of Military Occupational Skills.  OccFld managers 
are also responsible for assigning MOS managers who provide technical support and 
expertise for all matters relating to the MOS or groups of MOSs they are responsible for. 
Billet sponsors are those responsible for billets external to the Marine 
Corps in which Marines serve.  As the representative to other services or organizations, 
they are responsible for remaining up-to-date with Marine Corps force structure matters. 
This overview of the MROC and key participants supporting and 
contributing to the development of the Marine Corps force structure process is meant as 
both a familiarization and to emphasis the sheer volume of Marine Corps wide 
involvement.  While most likely obvious to those more familiar with force structure 
processes, it is important for those less familiar to be exposed to how all the players 
interact, including various influences they may have on different parts of the overall 
system.  Greater depth of the tasks and responsibilities of each can be found in both the 
EFDS and TFSP Orders. 
C. TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE PROCESS  
The overall purpose of the TFSP is to provide the Commandant with a tool that 
matches capabilities needs to force structure solutions and the associated costs with a 
prioritized list of operationally feasible options.  As a subsystem of the Capabilities 
Based Assessment (EFDS Phases I and II), the TFSP uses the same products and under  
policy constraint, transforms  top-down and bottom-up recommendations into capabilities 
required to execute the Marine Corps Essential Tasks.  Like the parent systems detailed 
above, the TFSP also relies heavily on vetting under the DOTMLPF pillars. 
                                                 
38 MCO 5311.1D, Enc 1, 7-1–7-5. 
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1. Inputs 
Inputs include various outside influences that affect a process, and/or factors that 
create direction and impetuous for action within the TFSP.  Two primary types of inputs 
are top-down and bottom-up.  One of the top-down planning products is the MAGTF 
Capabilities List, the same product from the Functional Area Analysis, Phase I of the 
EFDS.  Tools that are common to both top-down and bottom-up identification of force 
structure capability gaps are:  
Universal Needs Statement (UNS)—acts as a “work request” after a gap has been 
identified and details a specific equipment or structure request in order to fill that gap.  
They can be submitted top-down by the DCs/Advocates or bottom-up from operational 
commanders or supported elements.  Most UNS are for equipment requests.  If an UNS is 
for a force structure request, it must be for compensated force structure of like kind.  (For 
example, enlisted billets can only replace other enlisted billets, officers can only replace 
officers, and so force.)  Any uncompensated force structure UNS received is returned to 
the requestor with further instructions for resubmission as an uncompensated structure 
request for the next Uncompensated Review Board (URB).  UNS may also be used to 
identify redundant or unneeded capabilities.39  An example of an UNS template can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Table of Organization and Equipment Change Request (TOECR)—is a request 
for modification to any data stored in the TFSMS.  TOECRs are submitted electronically 
through the Combat Development Tracking System and can come from one of two 
sources.  The first source is either top-down from the Occupational Field and MOS 
managers or bottom-up from billet sponsors and the operating forces.  The second 
TOECR source is as a by-product of the URB, after structure decisions have already been 
made and are ready to be updated in the TFSMS.  
Uncompensated Structure Requests—Force structure change requests are either 
compensated or uncompensated.  Compensated requests work similarly to “pay-as-you-
go” rules in that the request is received with force structure suggestions included.  This is 
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done when a commander identifies and uses excesses in their own command to fill 
identified gaps.  UNS and TOECRs are expected to be compensated.  Uncompensated 
requests are those that do not include force structure solutions and require new structure 
to be added to fill identified gaps.  All uncompensated structure requests are submitted to 
the annual URB where they are “racked and stacked” against each other in the 
competition for very limited force structure resources.  All submissions to the URB are 
required to be in a very specific format with the required supporting documents.  The 
troop-to-task analysis is the primary enclosed justification for an uncompensated 
structure request, showing that the requesting unit has done their analytical homework 
prior to DOTMLPF consideration.40 Examples of uncompensated structure request 
templates can be found in Appendixes C, D, and E. 
a. Top-Down Specific—Strategic Guidance  
Changes in mission or equipment (or both) are the primary driving forces 
for action within the TFSP system.  Changes in mission requirements can come from 
several high-level sources, most notably the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the 
President, and Congress.  Changes in equipment are typically initiated during the 
Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) process.41  The distinction between top-down 
and bottom-up can be blurred depending on where and by whom the force structure 
change or gap was identified. 
b. Bottom-Up Specific—Fleet Marine Force Needs 
When the top-down strategic guidance changes to such a great extent that 
the operating forces can no longer perform their missions as prescribed—or if equipment 
from the existing Tables of Organization and Equipment are no longer deemed 
sufficient—MARFOR and combatant commanders not only have the ability to influence 
the force structure process from the bottom, but are highly encouraged to do so.42  The 
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tools they use to do this are the same ones that can also result from the top-down EFDS 
process, the UNS, TOECR, and uncompensated structure requests.  Combatant 
commanders however, have an addition tool: 
Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS)—similar to an UNS, an 
Urgent UNS initiates a less accurate, abbreviated, but more expedient request for critical 
shortages identified in the field.  Because UUNS do not undergo the same DOTMLPF 
scrutiny as UNS receive, it is expected that the acceptance of UUNS will result in some 
kind of structure deficiency that is partially mitigated and tolerated due to the short term 
operational necessity.43 
Inputs to the TFSP are summarized in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   TFSP Inputs 
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2. Throughputs44 
The throughput, or Analysis Phase, runs parallel to the Functional Needs Analysis 
from the EFDS Phase I, step 2.  While the TFSD does not actually perform the FNA, it 
works in tandem as a force structure subject expert with the IDs who do perform the FNA 
in order to develop the MAGTF Gaps List.  If Mission Essential Tasks cannot be 
performed by the operating forces to the standards or conditions required, then gaps are 
identified and force structure may be proposed to fill those gaps.  This phase functions to 
compare what the Marine Corps needs to do (METLs) against what the MAGTF 
Capabilities List says it can do and holds both up to existing force structure for potential 
materiel and non-materiel solutions to the identified force structure gaps.  TFSD’s 
primary function in this process is to serve as the integrator between the existing total 
force structure and new demand signals.  The demand signals are received through 
DOTMLPF Assessments as lateral input within the CDD, gaps identified through the 
CBA from higher, and through the submission of UNS, TOECRs and uncompensated 
structure requests, or UUNS from the operating forces.   
The primary throughput of the TFSP is the annual Uncompensated Review Board.  
The URB is the vetting process for all uncompensated force structure requests.  It is 
suggested that organizations look within their own structures prior to submitting an 
uncompensated request.  However, when structure cannot be found, the URB processes 
the requests, prioritizes them with recommended compensation, and with the DOTMLPF 
Working Group’s estimate of supportability, are presented to the DC CD&I for 
approval.45 
Any uncompensated force structure considerations involving manpower (billets) 
must be accompanied by a troop-to-task analysis in order to validate the need for 
manpower force structure changes.  This is done by matching a unit’s METs against the 
MCTL and skills detailed in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Manual, MCO 
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1200.17A.  As the troop-to-task analysis is a required attachment to any uncompensated 
force structure change request and, it is accomplished by the units submitting the request. 
3. Outputs46 
The identified force structure gaps are then forwarded to internal subject matter 
experts who analyze them for DOTMLPF implications, with the scale of the solution 
driving the scale of the analysis.  If a functional gap can potentially be satisfied with the 
deletion or addition of force structure, these implications are then also analyzed for 
DOTMLPF implications. 
Once a price tag can be placed on the human resource cost, by modeling 
authorized end-strength against the new structure requirement, the initiative is sent to the 
MROC to compete against other priorities.  The options available to the MROC at this 
point are to accept the identified risks of current manning, to make internal adjustments 
to satisfy the identified requirement, or to present to the CMC an argument for more 
resources.47 
Results of the output phase are: 
a. Initiates Other Program Changes 
Once billet and equipment requirements are correctly entered into the 
Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS), this triggers the Human Resource 
Development Process, Acquisition Process, and Material Total Life Cycle Management 
Process. 
b. Approved Acquisition Objective 
If the FSA (Phase II, Step 1) recommends a new materiel solution to a 
capability gap, the AAO process is how a new materiel solution is added to the total force 
structure.  DC, CD&I, as the AAO process owner has tasked the Director, CDD with 
responsibility for its management and maintenance. 
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c. Total Force Structure Management System 
In addition to the TFSP, the TFSD is also responsible for managing the 
results of the process in the TFSMS.  The TFSMS is the one authoritative source for all 
force structure requirements and authorizations.  The version in use is a propriety 
program that is in its final operational testing phases.  Further evaluation of functionality 
will be better assessed after the next publication of the semi-annual Authorized Strength 
Report in March 2010. 
d. Updates to the TO&E and MOS Manual 
Once MROC approval is given for changes to force structure, the updates 
are documented in the applicable Table(s) of Organization and Equipment in the TFSMS. 
It is the TFSD’s responsibility to draft and publish all MCBUL 5400s, which are the 
official notification processes for force structure changes.  In the event force structure 
changes require a reassignment of MOS duties, the MOS manual is also revised to reflect 
the updates. 
e. Publishing of Related Orders and Directives 
In addition to the above actions, the remaining product outputs the DC 
CD&I is responsible for publishing as a result of the TFSP is MCO 5311.1, MCO 
5320.12 (Precedence Levels for Manning and Staffing), the announcement of force 
structure changes in the MCBul 5400, the assignment of Advocates, Occupational Field 
Managers, and MOS specialists every fiscal year, the Maritime Prepositioning Force List, 
the bi-annual Authorized Strength Report, and the Organization of Marine Corps Forces 
(MCRP 5-12).48 
Figure 9 depicts a summary of the overlapping EFDS, CBA, and TFSP 
force structure planning and development processes and the associated products. 
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Figure 9.   Overlapping processes 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter’s explanation of the force development process is straightforward but 
complex.  One source of complexity is the interaction among multiple systems and 
stakeholders including the Acquisition System, DoD Budgeting system, and the Marine 
Corps Human Resource Development Process (HRDP).  The TFSP relies solely on 
subordinate units to provide troop-to-task analyses to justify their requests for any 
manpower changes in the complex force structure system.  Unfortunately, as the next 
chapter highlights, there is quite limited information in the TFSP that offers instructional 
guidance on how the procedure should be conducted. 
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IV. TROOP-TO-TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS 
A. OVERVIEW 
1. What Is a Troop-to-Task Analysis? 
Enclosure (1) of MCO 5311.1D, the Total Force Structure Process Procedure 
Manual, defines a troop-to-task analysis as: 
A troop-to-task analysis is done by evaluating each mission essential task 
(MET) that the unit is charged with executing through the use of subject 
matter expertise (SME), and determining the right skills by grade and 
quantity needed to accomplish the prescribed tasks assigned…..SMEs 
utilize the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Manual as the baseline 
of the troop-to-task analysis by matching the METs  of the unit to the 
available core and above core tasks available in the Marine Corps human 
resource development system. 
At face value, the definition seems fairly simple.  But, where do each of these 
elemental products—the mission essential tasks, core tasks, above core tasks—come 
from?  What actions or events trigger the need for a troop-to-task analysis to be 
conducted?  Who are the “subject matter experts” and what are their roles affecting the 
process?  Who are the primary stakeholders in this process?  As was expressed by senior 
personnel at the Operations Department, Total Force Structure Division, a central 
concern is that the process has evolved incrementally resulting in added complexity 
mixed with human subjectivity.  This chapter describes the TFSD’s current procedures 
and requirements for conducting a troop-to-task analysis.  The final chapters conclude 
with an analysis of the TFSD as an organizational system prior to the conclusions and 
recommendations for addressing concerns with the current troop-to-task analysis 
processes. 
2. Requirements 
All uncompensated structure requests submitted to the TFSD for consideration 
during the current Uncompensated Request Board are required to contain a troop-to-task 
analysis as a justification for the force structure change requests.  This means that the 
TFSD is not actually performing the analysis themselves, but providing technical 
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guidance to those above and below echelons who are submitting the uncompensated 
structure requests.  Structure requests are submitted in package form per the current 
year’s MARADMIN detailing the submission process.  TFSD is responsible for 
conducting the URB, performing the required DOTMLPF analysis with the requisite 
subject matter experts, and prioritizing any solutions prior to submission to the MROC 
for approval of very limited new force structure.   
B. THE TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE DIVISION TROOP-TO-TASK 
ANALYSIS PROCESS 
1. Inputs 
A troop-to-task analysis is required when one (or both) of two organizational 
changes occur: a change in mission or a change in equipment.  Either of these events can 
trigger the need for a change to the Marine Corps’ Marine Corps Tasks and/or a unit’s 
Mission Statement and Mission Essential Tasks.   
a. Definitions 
Mission Statement—Each Marine Corps organization is required to have a 
Mission Statement, which can be found in the TFSMS in the T/O&E report.  The Mission 
Statement describes an organization’s mission and tasks, its organization, command and 
signal, administrative and logistical capabilities, and its concept of employment.49  The 
concept employment is how that organization intends to utilize its personnel and 
equipment in order to accomplish the assigned mission.  For this reason, it has a direct 
impact on how many billets (number of personnel based on requirements) and the kind 
and amount of equipment it requires.  
Task—Defined as an action or activity (derived from an analysis of the 
mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual or organization that provides 
a capability.50 
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Marine Corps Tasks (MCTs)—A part of Marine Corps doctrine, MCTs 
describe tasks by title, a description of what it each should accomplish, and the measures 
and standards by which proficiency is rated in order to assure successful mission 
accomplishment.51 
Marine Corps Task List (MCTL)—Collection of all approved MCTs. 
Core Mission Essential Tasks (METs)—Just like it sounds, the crucial 
tasks required for a unit to successfully complete its mission.  The distinction between 
core METs and MCTs are that these tasks are specifically attached to and derived from a 
unit’s or organization’s mission statement. 
Mission Essential Task List (METL)—Collection of a unit’s or 
organization’s (core) METs. 
b. Top-Down Inputs 
If the MCTL or any unit mission changes based on changes in national 
security or changes in Marine Corps doctrine, this can trigger the need for top-down 
troop-to-task analysis to determine how the doctrinal change is likely to affect the 
operating forces.  Likewise, if a doctrinal mission statement changes, this will also have a 
top-down effect that should require a troop-to-task analysis.  If the change results in a gap 
that is best resolved by a submission to the URB, a troop-to-task analysis is completed by 
the requesting unit as a required part of the package. 
c. Bottom-Up Inputs 
As mentioned previously, commanders are highly encouraged to 
participate in doctrinal development when they notice structural changes due to evolving 
circumstances that have not yet been reflected doctrinally.  Common examples are when 
units are hastily fielded new equipment, but do not have the inherent structure to utilize it 
or when missions change to reflect rapidly evolving battlefield conditions.  A troop-to-
task analysis at the operational unit level is conducted to validate changes observed in 
billet or equipment requirements. 
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2. Throughputs52 
The first step of any troop-to-task analysis is to compare an organization’s METL 
to the MCTL, to identify all tasks it must be able to perform to accomplish mission 
success.  Once this is completed, there are three additional phases.  The template TFSD 
provides as an example is in Appendix C. 
a. Develop Subtasks 
The development of subtasks is the identification of all implied tasks that 
must be accomplished in order to fulfill the commander’s MET responsibility.  For 
example, for the MET “Operate a COC (combat operations center),” implied tasks are to 
conduct fire support planning, prepare combat operations, direct the intelligence effort, 
process casualties, and so forth. 
b. Determine Proper Mix of Billets and Equipment 
Once a complete list of tasks a unit is responsible for accomplishing has 
been developed, the next step is to populate the tasks with the sufficient number of billets 
and type of equipment needed with which to perform those tasks.  The distribution of this 
work load is further broken down into day-to-day and contingency operations.  The 
Military Occupational Specialty Manual, MCO 1200.17A, is the primary tool used to 
develop the billets and the Table of Authorized Material Control Numbers (TAMCN) is 
used to identify equipment.  Equipment requirements are distinguished as individual, 
organizational, or both.53 
c. Build the Organization 
With the previous steps complete, a new or modified organization is 
framed that adequately reflects the requirements necessary to complete the unit’s mission 
and the correct number and type of billets and equipment with which to do so. 
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3. Outputs 
a. A Product Tool 
The output of a troop-to-task analysis process can be any number of 
updates to products inherent in the force structure process.  Its immediate use however, is 
as a product tool that is used in further analysis and debate during the Uncompensated 
Review Board in order to prioritize uncompensated structure requests.   
b. Doctrinal Changes 
If the troop-to-task analysis results are accepted and the resultant force 
change and/or mission statement changes are deemed appropriate, the troop-to-task 
analysis instigates these doctrinal changes.  The TFSMS is the integrating system that 
manages, records, and tracks these changes.  These changes may include additions and/or 
revisions to the MOS manual, the T/O&E, units’ mission statements, and the MCTL. 
c. A Process Trigger 
Once changes are approved through the MROC process, signed by the 
Commandant, and updated in the TFSMS, the final output is a trigger to other vital 
Marine Corps planning processes.  The programs that are directly influenced by the 
TFSMS are the Human Resource Development Process, the Acquisition Process, and the 
Life Cycle Management Process.54 
4. Summary 
A troop-to-task analysis is in very broad terms any analytic process that matches 
personnel and equipment to a specified list of tasks to be performed for the purpose of 
developing the structure necessary to complete a mission.  For the Marine Corps, this is 
typically accomplished by determining the minimum amount of structure that can 
accomplish a unit’s METs and any implied tasks as derived from the doctrinal MCTL.  
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The purpose that a troop-to-task analysis serves the TFSP is to provide a justification for 
the force structure requests received from either higher or lower echelons.  As such, they 
are usually performed by the requesting unit with the guidance that TFSD provides.  
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V. ANALYSIS  
A. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II explained some of the most commonly accepted organizational theories 
and models used in systems analysis.  For review, these were Mintzberg’s theory of 
organizational configurations, a systems model developed by Roberts, and Thompson’s 
Typology, a Configuration model.  Using elements from each, this section describes how 
the Total Force Structure Division functions within both the Total Force Structure 
Process and Expeditionary Force Development System, how the TFSD utilizes and 
integrates troop-to-task analyses, and then makes observations about the system and 
program interactions.  While the TFSD’s troop-to-task analysis process is only one of 
many products found in one of many subsystems, examining how each of these interact 
from a systems standpoint will clarify areas of organizational strength and identify 
potential areas for improvement for the final observations and recommendations. 
B. THE TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE DIVISION AS A SYSTEM 
The systems model is an excellent tool for providing the basic framework of 
inputs, throughputs, and outputs of an organizational system such as the TFSD.  Figure 
10 is another representation of the basic framework presented in Chapter II.  Figure 11 is 
the same framework, but with the TFSD’s characteristics added for further consideration 
and discussion.  By going through each of the systems model components, terminology 




Figure 10.   Roberts’ Systems Model, revisited (From Roberts, 2000) 
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Figure 11.   TFSD Systems Model 
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1. Context 
The external environment within which TFSD functions is complex with many 
real-world fiscal and political constraints.  Complexity comes from the number of 
strategic documents with which it needs to adhere, and the number of equally complex 
systems with which it overlaps.  Another aspect of the external environment it must 
consider is the political, civil, and physical operating environment that Marines forces 
must function and fight in.  All these drive the restrictions, conditions, and solutions with 
which TFSD integrates in order to make analytical arguments and decisions regarding 
force stabilization and analytical arguments for new force structure procurement. 
2. Key Success Factors 
In order for this type of organization to be successful, it must be adept at high 
levels of cooperation and integration.  Functioning in an integration role, it not only 
serves as the Marine Corps’ force structure subject matter expert, but also the document 
and force structure doctrine record keeper.  As such, this information needs to be not only 
visible, but also easily accessible to both higher and lower system users.  Like most 
Marine organizations, the TFSD has to be creative at finding ways to “do more with 
less”.  Because of the number of potentially far-reaching consequences across the Marine 
Corps, consistent, critical, long term planning is crucial for total organizational success. 
3. System Direction 
Capabilities Based Planning is a relatively new requirement.  As such, the TFSD 
and the other nine Combat Development Directorate divisions have only been in 
existence in their present structure since 2005.  The current version of the Marine Corps 
Order guiding the entire TFSP was signed as recently as 26 February 2009.  The 
electronic submission of UNS, UUNS, and TOECRs has been a requirement in only the 
past year.  While driving factors such as internal requirements, mission statements, and 
directives are established, the TFSD overall is still a new organization and as to be 
expected, is still experiencing a somewhat steep learning curve. 
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4. Design Factors 
a. Tasks 
As described in previous sections, there appears to be no shortage of tasks 
within the TFSD.  Of note, what the TFSD does not do the troop-to task analyses.  This 
type of analysis is specifically tasked to be done by the uncompensated force structure 
requestor.  Because the TFSD’s involvement in the troop-to-task analysis is limited to 
providing instruction to the actual analysts only, there is a limited understanding of how 
to remove inherent subjectivity and even of what the desired end product should look 
like. 
b. Technology 
Much of the TFSD’s technology, in the form of the TFSMS, electronic 
request tracking, and the internal Share Point technology is relatively new.  Some of this 
technology is still completing the developmental stages.  Not only do the personnel use 
these systems on a daily basis, but there is also a requirement to train end users how to 
use the technology properly. 
c. Structure 
Like any military organization, the chain of command is the predominant 
reporting and discipline structure.  Unlike the typical military chain of command, the 
TFSD is highly integrated in a horizontal fashion with the parallel CDD divisions, the 
various Advocates, and the inputs from the operational and supported elements. 
According to Mintzberg’s organizational configurations, the TFSD 
resembles both a machine and a professional bureaucracy.  In machine bureaucracies, the 
technostructure is the key part of the organization.  One way to look at the TFSD is as a 
representation of the technostructure of the entire Expeditionary Force Development 
System.  They are the analysts who provide direct support, formal planning, and control 
of the work of others.  The standardization of UNS, TOECRs, and troop-to-task analysis 
comes from the TFSD, who oversees, directs, and provides technical support to the 
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process.  Like any other technostructure, they do not actually perform much of this work 
themselves, but train those who do and track its progress. 
In professional bureaucracies, the operating core is the key part of the 
organization.  The operating core consists of the workers who perform the basic goods 
and services of the organization and is by nature more decentralized than the machine 
bureaucracy.  In addition to functioning as the technostructure to provide the technical 
support to the EFDS, the TFSD also has to operate as an operating core would function; 
as an organization of skilled professionals who must be given a considerable amount of 
autonomy over their analytical work.  This aspect is exemplified through the TFSD’s 
DOTMLPF working group responsibilities.  The personnel of the TFSD need to function 
both as self-sufficient, highly trained force structure professionals and also as the 
technical oversight for key system products. 
d. People 
The TFSD’s personnel come from a variety of different backgrounds and 
experience levels.  While many have specialized training such as master’s level degrees 
from the Naval Postgraduate School, many do not.  Civilian personnel function to 
provide a necessary level of stability to the two to three year rotation most active duty 
personnel serve in the organization.  Subject matter experts are so named for their MOS 
background experience, not their experience with the force structure process itself.  Most 
training is thus on-the-job, as no formal school exists to specifically teach Marine Corps 
force structure processes.  While some level of Mintzberg’s standardization of skills 
exists in the form of training to use the computerized programs, there is no formalized 
standardization of analytical skills for conducting the tasks traditionally performed by an 
operating core.  This is further exasperated by the technostructure’s lack of formalized 
training for how to provide technical support to the troop-to-task analysis process.  Those 
in the position to provide the training to the personnel required to actually do the work do 
not have sufficient technical training themselves.   
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e. Subsystems 
According to Thompson’s Typology, the TFSD can be placed somewhere 
between sequential and reciprocal interdependence.  At times, interdependence is 
sequential, as one branch’s outputs become another branch’s inputs.  At other times, the 
work is required to function with more expediency cooperation; thus becoming more 
interdependent.  The coordination styles are likewise split.  There is a certain amount of 
coordination by plan, as is specified in the TFSP and EFDS Orders and the internal TFSD 
Standard Operating Procedures.  There also appears to be a high level of coordination by 
mutual adjustment with frequent interaction and feedback amongst the branches in 
individual personalities. 
5. Culture 
While details were not readily observable in the time allowed, the TFSD culture 
appears to be a general reflection of the larger USMC environment.  Because of the 
number of different MOS backgrounds, the culture is presumably somewhat varied—
standard for the typical Marine staff billet.  Any potentially radical shifts in culture are 
most likely negated by the long term civilian leadership presence. 
6. Outputs 
Standardization of outputs is one of the primary functions the TFSD serves.  
Because the TFSD is tasked with managing the TFSMS and updating all affected Orders 
and publications, quality control of these outputs serves as an integral function for the 
entire Marine Corps.  The one area of identifiable difficulty the TFSD has with product 
outputs is the development of training and technical oversight of the troop-to-task 




The primary outcome of the TFSD is ultimately Marine Corps mission 
accomplishment.  Without proper force structure supported by sufficient equipment, the 
Marine Corps cannot satisfactorily perform its missions.  The TFSD contributes to this by 
providing a layer of analysis to the TFSP, acting as the force structure subject matter 
expert, serving as an integration unit between bottom-up and top-down requirements, and 
providing a prioritized list of force structure solutions to the MROC for approval by the 
Commandant. 
C. EXAMINATION OF A TROOP-TO-TASK ANALYSIS  
The following example is an actual troop-to-task analysis that was submitted by 
the Commanding Officer of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and endorsed by 
the Commanding General of III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), as a required 
attachment to an uncompensated structure request for the 2009 Uncompensated Review 
Board.  Figure 12 is the Justification slide from the URB brief, which details the reasons 
why this force structure request should be filled. Table 3 is the product submitted for 
MET mapping per Example 1 of the troop-to-task analysis template found in MCO 
5311.1D.  Table 4 is the organizational structure per Example 2.  For reference, a blank 
















Table 3.   Example 2 from 31st MEU 2009 URB submission 
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Per MARADMIN 031/09, Policies and Procedures for the 2009 Uncompensated 
Review Board, requests were required to be signed by a three-star MARFOR 
Commander or three-star MAGTF Advocate and submissions were required to include a 
cover letter with justification for the identified capability gap and accompanied by a 
completed mission statement, initiative brief, and a troop-to-task analysis per the 
templates provided by the TFSD. 
The purpose for requiring external units to submit a troop-to-task analysis with 
uncompensated structure requests is because the requesting unit presumably has the 
expertise and understanding with which to conduct a thorough analysis.  Because this 
level of presumed expertise is not inherent within the TFSD, the TFSD relies on the 
thoroughness of the accompanying troop-to-task analysis with which to argue for and 
prioritize the multitude of requests it must evaluate during the URB process.  For 
reference, the 2009 URB had 61 of these briefs to consider, each trying to present a case 
for why they should receive more force structure than the current Table of Organization 
and Equipment allows.  It is presumably in the requester’s best interest to make as strong 
an analytical argument as possible. 
In this example from the 31st MEU, the request is only for one future operations 
officer (a major) to be able to better conduct future operations planning.  It loosely 
follows the troop-to-task analysis guidance provided in MCO 5311.1D, first by 
identifying the unit’s tasks as defined by the Mission Essential Task List.  In this 
example, the task identified in the METL is “responsible for planning future operations”.  
It then lists a number of implied tasks such as plan for future amphibious raids, plan for 
future security operations, etc and identifies a future operations officer as the billet that 
should be accomplishing these tasks.  The troop-to-task analysis then performs the 
building of the new organization, based off Example 2 from the template, by developing 
a proposed organization that reflects the requested force structure change. 
What does this troop-to-task analysis really accomplish?  By perusing the 
submissions for the 2009 URB, it appears that some commands provided an analysis 
similar to the one detailed here, some have several analyses as the request is for multiple 
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units, tasks, and MOSs, and some did not appear to submit a troop-to-task analysis at all.  
So is the troop-to-task analysis a useful exercise, and if so, who should be performing 
them? 
From external observation, it appears that while the troop-to-task analysis is 
typically completed as requested, it may not be fulfilling TFSD’s intentions of providing 
a thorough analysis.  An obvious omission in the current template is a format or 
instructions for how to divide tasks by the time it takes to complete them.  In the 31st 
MEU future operations officer example, the analysis lists a number of implied tasks that 
are part of “plan for future operations”.  But it does not list any time requirements for 
which an individual is expected to be doing these tasks.  There is also a lack of any 
justification given for the grade of major as requested.  Instead of a thorough analysis, it 
appears that the requesting unit simply fulfilled the troop-to-task analysis template 
requirement by filling in “this is what I need and this is where I need it” without the 
complexity that may be desired by those who make future force structure decisions based 
partly from the enclosed troop-to-task analysis.  On the other hand, if this is the level of 
complexity TFSD expects or requires, then the previously submitted troop-to-task 
analyses seem to be fulfilling that role. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Chapter II has described traditional systems theory and models that provided a 
common language and background for further Marine Corps systems analysis.  The 
systems theory and models were followed by an abbreviated description of the entire 
Total Force Structure Process and how it fits into the bigger Capabilities Based Planning 
picture.  Once the big picture view was presented it was followed by a description of the 
Total Force Structure Division’s troop-to-task analysis process, a very narrow and 
specific TFSP product.  Lastly, the TFSD was reexamined under the systems theory 
framework prior to the examination of an actual troop-to-task analysis presented per the 
requisite guidance to the 2009 Uncompensated Review Board. 
The remainder of this thesis will detail conclusions that have been drawn from the 
prior lengthy qualitative process.  Lastly, recommendations are provided, which are based 
from an examination of other troop-to-task analyses used by other very different 
organizations.  These recommendations vary in complexity between maintaining the 
status quo and the development of an entirely new computer based troop-to-task analysis 
program. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conclusion 1 
The Total Force Structure Division’s troop-to-task analysis ultimately serves a 
small and very specific function within one sub process of the Total Force Structure 
Process.  The need for conducting a troop-to-task analysis is referenced in only three 
sections of the entire MCO 5311.1D; either as a subcomponent of TFSD’s analytical 
processes during the Uncompensated Review Board or as a tool with which MAGTF and 
Functional Advocates can systematically build manpower and the accompanying 
equipment requirements as capability gaps develop.  In either of these scenarios, the 
troop-to-task process, as it is currently written, is rather ill defined and subjective by 
nature. 
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Course of Action (COA) 1 
Maintain the status quo.  The current guidance provided may be adequately 
serving the needs and intentions it is intended to serve.  If the present level of subjectivity 
is acceptable, there are other methods of justification for uncompensated structure 
requests, such as the mission statements and contents of the URB briefs.  The process of 
conducting a troop-to-task analysis may be useful in and of itself as a tool to further the 
justification process for the submitting unit. 
2. Conclusion 2  
The Marine Corps does not have a defined or doctrinally based troop-to-task 
process.  Lacking such a process, the TFSD in the past few years has “borrowed” what 
has been developed so far by the Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) Service 
Componency Working Group (SCWG).  It was this working group that contributed 
indirectly to the development of the troop-to-task template and instructions in Appendix 
L of MCO 5311.D.  The TFSD also has a SCWG handout titled “MARFOR Troop-to-
Task Analysis” that accompanied the URB troop-to-task template.  However, the 
methodology detailed appears to be far beyond the scope of the average uncompensated 
structure request submitter.   
Background55 
The National Plans Branch (PLN) of PP&O led a Service Componency Review 
Group (SCRG) from 2006–2008.  Its primary task was essentially to conduct a MARFOR 
wide troop-to-task analysis in order to assess the effectiveness of the Marine Corps 
service components and the MARFORs ability to perform their required tasks.  Because 
no standardized methodology for conducting a troop-to-task analysis exists, the SCRG 
worked with the Center for Naval Analysis to review all MARFOR Tables of 
Organization and Equipment.  The methodology that was developed had two main 
 
 
                                                 
55 SCWG, “Service Componency Working Group Overview,” PLN internal document. 
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shortcomings: 1. Inconsistency from each MARFOR as they developed their own list of 
required tasks, and 2. Insufficiency in method for prioritization of tasks to determine the 
efficiency of manpower resources. 
The SCWG was tasked in 2009 to conduct another componency review and 
address capability gaps that had been identified by the SCRG.  Because of the problems 
with methodology that were highlighted during the first MARFOR troop-to-task analysis, 
the approved course of action with which to do this was to use a civilian contractor 
analysis tool for the cost of 250,000–400,000 dollars.  The contractor chosen was WBB 
Consulting, who has been assisting the SCWG with its current troop-to-task analysis with 
the use of a proprietary data analysis tool called Workforce Analysis Tool (WAT).  
Figure 13 is a slide from the SCWG’s task analysis workshop conducted in February 
2010.  It provides a simple demonstration of what the WAT does, essentially 
computerized troop-to-task analysis using tasks (demand) as the primary analytical unit.  
Unfortunately, the contract is expected to expire once the SCWG has completed the 
current review.  In conversation, the SCWG chair LtCol Albert Moseley has agreed that 
this propriety tool is the most functional troop-to-task analysis process that the Marine 
Corps has used.  He laments that the contract will end without further support or funding 
as it is currently the only non-subjective analytical tool the Marine Corps has for 
conducting broad-scale troop-to-task analysis.56 
Course of Action 2 
Incorporate what the SCRG accomplished during the 2006–2008 review by 
formulating a set of troop-to-task business rules.  These business rules could consist of a 
standardized set of MAGTF level tasks, much like the SCRG’s “command level tasks” 
and standardized estimates of time allotted to complete them. Arguments for this COA 
would be to provide further instruction and standardization to the troop-to-task analysis 
process without having to resort to contractor provided support.  Arguments against this 
 
 
                                                 
56 LtCol Albert Moseley, telephone conversation, 12 February 2010. 
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COA are that it would be very time consuming few TFSD personnel resources to devote 
the amount of time it would require and it would not solve the same problems that the 
SCRG encountered.  Figure 14 displays a Workforce AnalysisTool. 
 
Figure 14.   Function of the Workforce Analysis Tool (From PP&O Componency Study 
Workshop Brief 2, 2010) 
Course of Action 3 
Use the chain of command to emphasize the importance of and garnish support 
for a Marine Corps wide troop-to-task analysis process in an effort to maintain and 
expand the work the PLN has already done.  The WBB Consulting product is not the only 




Another real-world product example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) Tool for Operational Planning, Force Activation and Simulation (TOPFAS).  
TOPFAS is a planning and support data system that has been in development since at 
least the turn of the century.  Primarily designed for NATO Strategic Commands, 
Combined Joint Planning Staff, Regional Commands, and other NATO military 
headquarters, it was launched to the operational community in 2008 and is currently in 
use in Afghanistan.57  One of the key outputs of the TOPFAS program is the Statement of 
Requirement—a completed troop-to-task analysis.  The Statement of Requirement is 
generated by selecting generic units, to which the program applies Troop-to-Task Rules 
(TTRs) that are a component of the TOPFAS database.58  It is unclear at what level of 
development the TTRs are currently at, however this level of standardization will most 
likely become more common as the military environment becomes more jointly 
integrated.  Figure 15 illustrates a TTR worksheet. 
 
                                                 
57 NATO C3 Agency, "Annual Report 2008." (2008): 23. 
[http://www.nc3a.nato.int/Documents/Annual%20Report%202008.pdf.]. 26 February 2010. 
58 Hakon Thuve, "TOPFAS (Tool for Operational Planning, Force Activation and Simulation)." 




Figure 15.   TOPFAS troop-to-task worksheet (From Thuve, 2010) 
3. Conclusion 3  
The Marine Corps does not have an identified analytical organization built into its 
force structure that prepares the documents and background analysis to support 
uncompensated force structure requests.  If the request stems from a top-down gap 
identification, there is a staff that can function in the analysis role to provide some level 
of analytical background work.  However, if an uncompensated request comes from a 
bottom-up identified gap, the operating forces do not have the luxury or often the 
background necessary to perform a detailed, thorough, and unbiased analysis.   
Background59 
The Army capabilities based assessment process is composed of three phases and 
like the Marine Corps CBA includes a functional area analysis, a functional needs 
analysis, and a functional solutions analysis.  The Army also has a process comparable to 
                                                 
59 LTC (ret) David Retherford, AFMS Instructor, Ft. Belvoir, telephone interview, 16 March 2010. 
 73
the URB, called the Functional Design Update (FDU) process.  Like the submission 
packet that comes with an uncompensated structure request, a number of justifications 
have to be submitted with each FDU organization change request.  The FDU requires five 
parts in its packet: a letter signed by the Force Modernization Proponent CG, an 
organizational design paper, a concept paper, a Unit Reference Sheet that shows the 
current to proposed structure, and a standalone briefing for the reviewing board.  Like the 
URB, these products are all sent to the Force Design Directorate before becoming official 
FDUs.  These pre-FDU documents are prepared by a branch within a number of 
schoolhouses under the Training and Doctrine Command, such as air defense, armor, 
aviation, infantry, etc.  The Branches are called Combat Development Integration 
Directorates (CDID), and appear to function much like the Marine Corps CDD 
Integration Divisions.  The take-away distinction from Army force structure development 
is that the CDIDs are solely responsible for the DOTMLPF analysis and the five required 
analytical documents that are part of the pre-FDU packet.  This process is distinctly 
different from the URB submissions that come from operation and supporting element 
commands of the Marine Corps.  While the Army takes both top-down and bottom-up 
gap identification like the Marine Corp, only the centralized CDIDs process those 
uncompensated force structure requests.  This presumably has two results: that the 
analysis packets, and thus the troop-to-task analyses, are more consistent and less 
subjective and that the process is not as expedient as when requests are received directly 
from the operating forces.  A counterpoint to note, however, is that Army FDUs are bi-
annual and thus a more frequent occurrence than the annual URB. 
Course of Action 4 
Develop the force structure necessary in the Total Force Structure Process that is 
trained and responsible for conducting more thorough and in depth analyses prior to 
uncompensated structure request review by the URB. 
4. Conclusion 4 
Unlike the Army Force Management School at Ft. Belvoir, there are no 
schoolhouses or coursework to teach the complicated, interconnected, and overlapping 
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processes of Marine Corps force structure and management.  The NPS Manpower 
Systems Analysis curriculum is designed to serve this function; however, Marine officers 
at NPS have very little to no exposure to Marine Corps processes while pursuing Special 
Education Program degrees.  Ultimately, a large percentage of pay-back billet education 
is still in the form of specialized on-the-job training. 
Course of Action 5  
Encourage the expansion of the Manpower Systems Analysis curriculum to 
incorporate essential elements of the Marine Corps framework into the existing Master’s 
program, or add a separate manpower course for Marine Corps officers attending.  Ensure 
that at least familiarization session(s) are available for Marine Corps students specifically 
addressing Marine Corps force structure and manpower management systems. 
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APPENDIX A.  ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS 
 





















Figure 20.   (From TFSD, 2008) 
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APPENDIX B.  TFSD UNS TEMPLATE 
 




Figure 22.   UNS Template, page 2 
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Figure 23.   UNS Template, page 3 
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Figure 24.   UNS Template, page 4 
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Figure 25.   UNS Template, page 5(All images from https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/, 
accessed 8 March 2010) 
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APPENDIX C.  TFSD TROOP-TO-TASK ANALYSIS TEMPLATE 
 
Figure 26.   Troop-to-Task Analysis Template, page 1  
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Figure 27.   Troop-to-Task Analysis Template, page 2 
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Figure 28.   Troop-to-Task Analysis Template, page 3 
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Figure 29.   Troop-to-Task Analysis Template, page 4 
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Figure 30.   Troop-to-Task Analysis Template, page 5(All images from MCO 5311.1D) 
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APPENDIX D.  UNCOMPENSATED STRUCTURE REQUEST 
TEMPLATE 
 
Figure 31.   Uncompensated Structure Request Template, page 1 
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Figure 32.   Uncompensated Force Structure Request Template, page 2(Both images from 
TFSD, 2009) 
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APPENDIX E.  MISSION STATEMENT TEMPLATE 
 
Figure 33.   Mission Statement Template, page 1 
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Figure 35.   Mission Statement Template, page 3(All images from MCO 5311.1D) 
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